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Abstract
An important concern of macroeconomic analysis is how interest rates affect the
cash balance demanded at a certain level of nominal income. In fact, the interest-
rate-elasticity of the liquidity demand determines the effectiveness of monetary policy,
which is useless under absolute liquidity preference, i.e. when the money demand is
perfectly elastic. An actuarial approach is developed in this paper for dealing with
random income. Assuming investors face liquidity constraints, a level of surplus exists
which maximises expected value. Moreover, the optimal liquidity demand is expressed
as a Value at Risk and the comonotonic dependence structure determines the amount
of money demanded by the economy. As a consequence, the interest-rate-elasticity
depends on the kind of risks and expectations. The more unstable the economy, the
greater the interest-rate-elasticity of the money demand. Moreover, part of the ad-
justment to reestablish the short-run monetary equilibrium may be performed through
volatility shocks.
Key words: Money demand; Monetary policy; Economic capital; Distorted risk
principle; Value-at-Risk.
IME-Classification: IE10, IE20, IE50.
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1 Introduction
The primary role of money is to allow the exchange of goods and services. Since payments
and expenditures do not usually occur at the same maturities, economic agents are forced
to maintain a stock of cash in order to fulfil assumed liabilities and operational spending.
On these grounds, according to the transactions motive, the demand for money is regarded
as being in proportion to the volume of transactions, which in turn may be considered as
proportional to income (see Howells and Bain, 2005). Moreover, when the magnitudes of
future cash flows are known with certainty, the required surplus can be precisely determined
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at the starting point. Under conditions of uncertainty, capital gains or losses arise and so
there is also a speculative motive for holding money. Accordingly, investors who are more
confident about capital gains prefer to invest more on risk and consequently retain fewer
provisions. Conversely, less confident investors demand less risk and so they maintain a
higher surplus.
However, capital markets offer a set of alternative securities in which cash balances can
be held. Some of these can be regarded as free of default-risk and can thus be considered
as perfect substitutes to money, with the difference that they also provide a return. Why
then should investors keep money at all? Actually, risk-free instruments are equal to money
except for availability and offered interest rates correspond to premiums for liquidity. In
frictional markets, it is not possible to attract or resign all required capital at any given
moment and so investors trying to avoid bankruptcy will demand money for precautionary
motives — to avoid insolvency.
According to the Keynes liquidity preference proposition (Keynes, 1935), the money de-
mand is positively affected by the level of income and negatively affected by the return offered
by a class of non-risky instruments. The first part of the proposition is a consequence of
the transactions motive. To explain the effect of the interest rate, Keynes emphasises the
role played by the speculative motive. Thus, decision makers expecting interest rates to rise
demand fewer risk-free securities in order to avoid capital losses. On the other hand, when
interest rates are expected to fall, more bonds are demanded — in this way, once interest
rates collapse and bond prices rise, capital gains can be attained. Therefore, fewer provisions
are maintained for higher levels of the interest rate and vice versa.
Still a distinction has to be made between nominal and real quantities. Nominal mag-
nitudes represent flows expressed in monetary units, while real quantities are expressed in
terms of the goods and services that money can purchase. The level of prices P establishes
the connection between real and nominal quantities in such a way that Y = P · y, where
Y and y denote the nominal and real income respectively. The liquidity demand is then
expressed in the following way:
L = P y · l(r) = Y · l(r) with dl(r)
dr
< 0
The liquidity preference function l(r) expresses the ratio between demanded cash balances
and nominal income. It is not likely to be constant but it may change slowly over time.
The inverse ratio of the liquidity preference function is called velocity of money. Let us
additionally denote by M the total offer of money, which although mainly controlled by the
central bank, can also be altered by private investors. It is traditionally related to a class
of narrow money, containing currency held by the public, and is denoted by M1. Therefore,
the short-run monetary equilibrium is given by the quantity equation:
M = P y · l(r) = Y · l(r) (1)
A change in the nominal quantity of money will require a change in one or more of the
variables determining the liquidity demand — i.e. P , y or r — in order to reestablish the
monetary equilibrium.
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In the quantity equation, liquidity preference plays a role in determining the monetary
equilibrium. When prices are regarded as rigid for short-run fluctuations1 and there is no
distinction between real and nominal magnitudes, the whole adjustment is performed in l(r).
In addition, if liquidity preference is absolute, i.e. if investors are satisfied at a single level
of the interest rate, the amount of money might change without a change in either nominal
income or interest rates. The amount of money is therefore of no consequence. Under such
circumstances, monetary policy is useless for dealing with short-run fluctuations.
Absolute liquidity preference corresponds to the case when the liquidity demand is per-
fectly elastic with respect to the interest rate. According to Keynes, the degree of elasticity
depends on how homogeneous expectations are, where perfect elasticity is obtained when
expected and actual values are the same. In this case, money and risk-free securities are
perfect substitutes — since no capital gains or losses are expected — and any increase of
the amount of money by buying bonds will push their prices up and thus lower the interest
rate. Consequently, speculators with firm expectations will absorb the additional cash by
selling bonds, a situation that will lower their prices until they reach a level consistent with
the original interest rates. Conversely, if the monetary authorities decreased the amount of
money by selling bonds, the rate of interest would rise, inducing speculators to absorb all
the extra offer of bonds. As a result, attempts by the monetary authorities to change the
interest rate would be thwarted by investors holding firm expectations (Friedman, 1970).
The situation is different if prices are flexible and liquidity preference is non-absolute.
Thus, let us suppose, as Friedman (1970) does, that prices adjust more rapidly than quan-
tities, so rapidly in fact that the price adjustment can be regarded as instantaneous. A
monetary expansion then produces a new equilibrium involving a higher price for the same
quantity, the higher this response the more inelastic the money demand. In the short-run,
production is encouraged until prices are reestablished at their original level. In the long-run,
new producers enter the market and existing plants are expanded. Throughout the process,
it takes time for output to adjust but no time for prices to do so.
Therefore, the efficacy of monetary policy largely depends on the degree of rigidity of
prices and the elasticity of the money demand, as well as on the stability of liquidity prefer-
ence. There is a consensus among researchers about the existence of a stable long-run rela-
tionship, though fluctuations of cash balances in the short-run remain unexplained. Episodes
like the missing money in the mid-seventies, the great velocity decline in the early eighties,
followed by the expansion of narrow money in the mid-eighties, or the velocity puzzle of
the mid-nineties, still lack a satisfactory explanation (Ball, 2001 and 2002; Carpenter and
Lange, 2002; Teles and Zhou, 2005). In accounting for such drawbacks, recent literature
has focussed on uncertainty, which is supposed to have been incremented after 1980 due to
deregulation and financial innovations (Atta-Mensah, 2004; Baum et al., 2005; Carpenter
and Lange, 2002; Choi and Oh, 2003; Greiber and Lemke, 2005). Calza and Sousa (2003)
have instead centered their attention on idiosyncracy and aggregation.
Deregulation and financial innovation are also given as arguments to support the role
of the opportunity cost in accounting for unexplained fluctuations (Ball, 2002; Collins and
Edwards, 1994; Duca, 2000; Dreger and Wolters, 2006; Teles and Zhou, 2005). Given that
1Keynes claims that this situation applies to conditions of underemployment. At full employment, all
adjustment would be in prices.
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the distinction between cash and alternative risk-free securities has blurred, the class of
money substitutes is extended to consider broader monetary aggregates, such as M2 (which
includes saving and small-denomination time deposits, as well as retail mutual funds) orM3
(which adds mutual funds, repurchase agreements and large-denomination time deposits).
According to this view, a stable long-run relationship exits and movements of the interest
rate can explain all short-run episodes, as long as the right monetary aggregate is used
(Ball, 2002). Teles and Zhou (2005) additionally argue that the term of financial securities
determines liquidity and so the set of Money Zero Maturity instruments, denoted by MZM ,
provides an appropriate reference for the opportunity cost.
An extended model is proposed in this paper, according to which liquidity preference
is explicitly determined by uncertainty and information. First the cash demand of a single
representative investor is obtained. The classic reference in this respect is Tobin (1958),
whose model is presented in Section 2. He assumes perfect market conditions, meaning that
risks are completely characterised by only two parameters, expected value and volatility,
while decision making is represented by a utility function. Moreover, lending and borrowing
are allowed without restriction. Under such circumstances, a single portfolio — combining
risk and equity — maximises expected utility and so liquidity preference is obtained as a
consequence of uncertainty and aversion-to-risk. By contrast, as obtained in the extended
model, under imperfect competition investors face liquidity constraints and consequently, in
Section 3 equity is treated as an additional liability. In addition, the behaviour of investors is
determined by the transformation of probabilities according to an informational parameter.
Then the expected return of the fund is maximised when the mathematical expectation of
the residual exposure (a measure of the cost of assuming bankruptcy) plus the opportunity
cost of capital, is minimised. In this way, I follow Dhaene et al. (2003), who on these terms
develop a mechanism for capital allocation (see also Goovaerts et al., 2005).
In fact, under liquidity constraints, individual liquidity demands are given by the quantile
functions — i.e. the Value-at-Risk — of the random variables describing risks, where the
arguments are occupied by the net opportunity returns on capital. Moreover, uncertainty
and expectations explicitly affect the amounts of demanded cash balances (see Equations
2 and 3). When looking for the aggregated surplus in Section 4, capital is supposed to be
provided by a central authority or financial intermediaries acting in a competitive market,
in such a way that a single interest rate is required for lending (see Equation 4). Hence
the situation is similar to the case of a centralised conglomerate distributing capital among
subsidiaries (Dhaene et al., 2003; Goovaerts et al., 2005) and the opportunity cost of money
is related to the average return over a class of money substitutes. Thus monetary aggregates
are determinants of liquidity preference in the model. Finally, within a Gaussian setting, the
aggregate exposure is also normally distributed and its volatility is equal to the weighted
average of individual volatilities (as established in Equation 5). Therefore, aggregation also
plays a role in the determination and stability of the liquidity demand. The final remarks
are given in Section 5.
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2 Liquidity Preference in Perfect Markets
According to the precautionary motive, to avoid insolvency investors maintain a stock of
money that in frictionless markets can be modified at any time by lending and borrowing.
Hence managers who maximise value demand no equity, which is actually the proposition
established by Modigliani and Miller (1958). However, risk-averse customers are sensible
to fluctuations and, as long as the business activities of financial intermediaries — which
accordingly are said to be opaque — are not observed by outsiders, a pressure is established
to be perceived as default-free. Under such circumstances, the value of the guarantee is given
by the price of an option putted on the aggregate exposure, with exercise price equal to the
amount of demanded cash (Merton, 1997).
In the model of Tobin (1958), risk-averse investors show liquidity preference as behaviour
towards uncertainty. Decisions are based on estimations of the probability distributions
characterising the price movements of assets transacted in perfect markets, such that the
following conditions are fulfilled. (PM1) Only two measures completely describe risks:
expected return and volatility — expressed as the standard deviation of the series of returns.
(PM2) Lending and borrowing are allowed at any moment for a common risk-free interest
rate — at least to a desired extent. (PM3) At any point of time, investors share expectations
concerning the future performance of securities and thus portfolios — the efficient market’s
hypothesis.
Let X denote the aggregate percentage — random — gain or loss of a mutual fund and,
on account of the transactions motive, let the cash demanded be regarded as proportional to
the level of income Y , such that L = Y · l. Since no liquidity constraints are imposed, such
surplus may be invested in the risk-free security to earn the return r, an instrument that
can be sold at any time funds are required — for in perfect markets there is always a buyer
who agrees to take any quantity at the market price. Hence the total claim is determined
by the random variable Y = (1− l) ·X + l · r and its expected value is equal to:
µY = E[Y ] = (1− l) · µX + l · r
Moreover, assuming the risky claim follows a Gaussian distribution with volatility σX , the
volatility of the portfolio is given by:
σY =
(
E
[
(Y − µY )2
]) 1
2 = (1− l) · σX
Solving for l in both equations, a linear relationship is established between the expected
return and the volatility of the portfolio:
µY = r +
µX − r
σX
· σY = r +ΨX · σY
This relationship determines the set of efficient portfolios — in the sense that for any combi-
nation outside the line, it is always possible to build a new fund providing the same expected
return and a lower risk, or the same risk but a higher return. Higher volatility offers in-
vestors the chance of large capital gains at the price of equivalent chances of large capital
losses, since Gaussian risks are symmetric. On the contrary, portfolios of low volatility insure
investors against capital losses but offer little prospect of gains. Therefore, a higher return
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can be obtained only if more risk is assumed. The term ΨX :=
µX−r
σX
denotes the Sharpe
Ratio, which gives the rate at which investors agree to assume more risk in order to obtain
greater return (Sharpe, 1966).
The way preferences affect portfolio decisions can then be analysed in the plane (σY , µY ),
where the indifference curves of risk-lovers should present negative slope, as long as such
individuals accept a lower expected return if there is a chance to obtain additional gains.
By contrast, averse-to-risk investors do not take more risk unless they are compensated by
a greater expected return and consequently, their indifference curves have positive slopes.
Moreover, more is regarded as better, so that indifference curves located to the upper left
corner of the plane are related to higher utilities. Therefore, for any risk-aversion profile,
the optimal combination is determined by the (tangency point of) intersection between the
unique indifference curve representing preferences and the line of efficient portfolios.
The efficient portfolio can be explicitly determined by introducing a utility function
satisfying the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms. Thus averse-to-risk investors
are characterised by concave utility functions (such that U ′′(y) < 0) while risk-lovers by
convex utility functions (such that U ′′(y) > 0). Moreover, the marginal utility U ′(y) is
positive over the whole range — more is better. In this way, every utility function — and
so the risk-profile of the investor — induces a level of utility to each portfolio, and rational
decision making under uncertainty is determined by the maximisation of the expected utility:
E [U(Y )] =
∫
U(y) dFY (y)
If Φ denotes the probability distribution function of a normalised Gaussian distribution —
with mean and volatility equal to zero and one respectively — the slope of the respective
indifference curve is given by (Tobin, 1958):
dµY
dσY
= −
∫ (
y−µY
σY
)
U ′(y) dΦ
(
y−µY
σY
)
∫
U ′(y) dΦ
(
y−µY
σY
)
As justified in the previous analysis, the optimal combination is obtained when the slope of
the indiference curve is equal to the Sharpe ratio:
dµY
dσY
=
µX − r
σX
In this way, the demand for money in terms of the interest rate is deduced: l = l(r).
Unfortunately, the sign of the dependence is ambiguous. So for quadratic utility functions
(as in Tobin, 1958) negative and positive elasticities are respectively obtained for interest
rates lower and higher than the squared volatility of the aggregate claim.
3 Rational Demand for Cash under Liquidity Constraints
The model of Tobin is generalised in this section, at the time that its main features are main-
tained, i.e. uncertainty is characterised by probability distributions and rational behaviour
is determined by maximising the expected value of income. However, liquidity constraints
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and differing expectations about risks are allowed, which means that markets are regarded
as imperfect and accordingly described by the following conditions. (IM1) Risks are taken
from a general class of probability distributions which economic agents distort according
to their information and knowledge when taking decisions. (IM2) Investors face liquidity
constraints at borrowing and lending. (IM3) Information is not fairly distributed and man-
agers have to expend effort to correctly asses prices. Consequently, investors keep different
expectations about risks.
Let the parameter θ denote the state of information of an investor holding a mutual
fund whose percentage return is represented by the random variable X. Because of the
precautionary motive, a guarantee L is maintained for a determined period of time in order
to avoid bankruptcy. Since under liquidity constraints non-risky assets cannot be converted
to money at any moment without incurring in additional costs — cash and risk-free securities
are not perfect substitutes — it is not possible to invest the surplus on a current account
to obtain the return r. Instead, equity is regarded as an additional liability and — based
on the transactions motive, as in Section 2 — the size of the guarantee is expressed as a
proportion of the level of income Y , such that L = Y · l, where l represents the proportion
of income assigned to the non-risky asset. Hence the percentage capital return of the total
portfolio can be expressed as Y = X − l − r · l and its expected value is given by:
Y · µθ,Y = Y · Eθ[Y ] =
(
Y · µθ,X − L
)− r · L = Y · [ (µθ,X − l)− r · l ]
Thus, decisions are affected by the percentage return on income:
µθ,Y := Eθ[Y ] = (µθ,X − l)− r · l
In giving a meaning to the informational parameter θ, let us stress the fact that expecta-
tions are wanted to be modified — and not tastes — and then probability beliefs should be
transformed. Moreover, the type can be given a broader meaning. So, while the utility func-
tion is intended to account for the psychological response of decision makers, the distortion
parameter is supposed to be also determined by information and knowledge, in the sense
that — as stated by De Finetti (1975) — information and knowledge permit a limitation of
expectations and so the perception of uncertainty should depend on both. Consequently, let
us define2:
Eθ [X] =
∫
x dFθ,X(x) =
∫
Gθ,X(x) dx :=
∫
GX(x)
1
θ dx
The cumulative and decumulative probability distribution functions have been introduced,
Fθ,X(x) = Pθ [X ≤ x] = 1− Pθ [X > x] = 1− Gθ,X(x). Whenever θ > 1 the expected value
of risk is overestimated and underestimated when θ < 1, in this way respectively accounting
for the behaviour of risk-averse and risk-lover investors.
2The proportional hazards distortion is introduced (Wang, 1995), so called since it is obtained by imposing
a safety margin to the hazard rate of risk in a multiplicative fashion: hθ,X(x) = 1θ ·hX(x) := 1θ · ddx ln GX(x),
with θ > 0. Other distortions can be used instead. In the general case, a distortion function is defined
— over the unit interval — and an axiomatic description is provided for the distorted price (see Wang et
al., 1997 and Wang & Young, 1998). Averse-to-risk investors are then characterised by concave — while
risk-lovers by convex — transformations. All the analysis that follows is maintained in the same terms under
this general setting (see also Mierzejewski, 2006).
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Notice, however, that individuals react differently depending on the sign of the capital
return. Actually, when a loss is suffered, cash is demanded to avoid default, while in the
case a gain is obtained the surplus can be used to pay current liabilities or assigned to new
investments. Hence the value of the contingent claim is simultaneously determined by two
markets which usually work under different conditions, for the borrowing and lending needs
of the economy use to differ. On these grounds, we should more properly write:
µθ,Y = Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]− Eθ [ (X + l)−]− r · l = ∆(l)− r · l
The term ∆(l) := Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]−Eθ [ (X + l)−] represents the economic margin obtained
because of financial intermediation, while Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]
accounts for the cost of assuming
bankruptcy — a role that can be adopted by the own investor, an insurance company or a
central authority. Rational subjects maximise value and accordingly the rational demand is
determined by the first order condition3:
∂
∂l
Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]− ∂
∂l
Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]− r = −Gθ,X (l∗) + Fθ,X (−l∗)− r = 0
Since Fθ,X (−l) = Pθ [ X ≤ −l ] = Pθ [ −X > l ] = Gθ,−X (l), the following is an equivalent
characterisation:
Gθ,−X (l∗)−Gθ,X (l∗) = r
The firm attains a maximum value as long as the expected income ∆(l) − r · l is a non-
decreasing and concave function, which can be mathematically assured if ∆′(l) > r and
∆′′(l) < 0 or equivalently, if Gθ,−X (l) − Gθ,X (l) > r and G′θ,−X (l) − G′θ,X (l) < 0. The
first inequality implies that, for a given amount of equity, the marginal loss due to financial
intermediation is greater than its opportunity cost — and accordingly there are incentives
to maintain a surplus. The second condition ensures concavity.
The rational money demand is thus determined in such a way the marginal gain minus the
marginal loss on capital — i.e. the instantaneous benefit of liquidity — equals the marginal
return of the sure investment. Therefore, the optimal capital allocation involves an optimal
exchange of a sure return and a flow of probability and it is the mass accumulated in the tails
of the distribution what matters. No explicit relationship is obtained for the cash demand,
but a numerical procedure can be implemented to find the solution.
Decision makers mainly concerned about the speculative and the precautionary motives
respectively focus on the terms Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]
and Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]
. Let us accordingly assume
that capital decisions are taken by risk managers who minimise bankruptcy and rely on the
average value of the insured return. Applying a Taylor series around zero:
Eθ
[
(X − l)+
] ≈ Eθ [X+] +(∂Eθ [(X − l)+]
∂l
(l = 0)
)
· l
3Applying the Leibnitz rule, such that ddl
∫ v(l)
u(l)
H(l, x) dFθ,X(x) =
∫ v(l)
u(l)
d
dlH(l, x) dFθ,X(x)+H (l, v(l)) ·
v′(l) − H (l, u(l)) · u′(l) (see, for example, Churchill, 1958) the relationship is obtained by noticing that:
Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]
=
∫∞
l
(x− l) dFθ,X(x) and Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]
= − ∫ −l−∞(x+ l) dFθ,X(x).
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Since the term
∂Eθ[(X− l)+]
∂l
(l = 0) represents the marginal reduction in insured capital gains
produced when attracting the first unit of equity, it can be regarded as a premum for solvency:
rθ,X := −
∂Eθ
[
(X − l)+
]
∂l
(l = 0) = Gθ,X(0) = Pθ [X > 0] (2)
Hence the following expression is obtained for the expected percentage income:
µθ,Y = Eθ [X+]− Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]− (r + rθ,X) · l
Under such conditions, precautionary investors that maximise value minimise bankruptcy
costs. Applying Lagrange optimisation, we obtain that decision makers attracts funds until
the marginal return of risk equals the total cost of capital:
− ∂
∂l
Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]− (r + rθ,X) = Gθ,−X (l∗)− (r + rθ,X) = 0
Equivalently, it can be said that investors stop demanding money at the level at which
the marginal expected gain in solvency equals its opportunity cost. Thus the optimal cash
demand is given by:
lθ,X (r + rθ,X) = G
−1
θ,−X (r + rθ,X) (3)
From this expression, the money demand follows a decreasing and — as long as the distribu-
tion function describing uncertainty is continuous — continuous path, whatever the kind of
risks and distortions (as as can be verified in Figures 1 and 2). The minimum and maximum
levels of surplus are respectively demanded when (r + rθ,X) ≥ 1 and (r + rθ,X) ≤ 0.
In Figure 1, the optimal demands for cash under Gaussian risks are depicted, distorted
according to different informational types. Averse-to-risk investors (characterised by θ > 1)
underestimate the cost of money and consequently prefer to keep a higher surplus. Risk-
lovers (characterised by θ < 1) behave in the opposite direction. In Figure 2, the money
demand is shown for non-distorted Gaussian probability distributions with the same mean
and different volatilities. Within this class, the exposure to risk is completely determined
by volatility and the lower its level the greater the efficiency, for the same expected return
is offered by every portfolio. Accordingly, in Figure 2 the liquidity demand is less and more
elastic the lower and the higher the variability of the fund respectively, or equivalently,
liquidity preference is less and more sensible to the cost of capital when decision makers re-
spectively face a safer and riskier environment. Moreover, as a consequence of the symmetry
of the Gaussian distribution, the demand curves intersect at the point r + rθ,X = 0.5. At
this level, there is an equal chance of obtaining a capital gain or loss for every volatility and
so the same amount of cash is demanded, equal to the expected value of the fund4.
In practical applications, intermediaries face operational and administrative costs, at
the time that a premium over the risk-free interest rate is asked for lending in secondary
markets. Hence, the return r + rθ,X can be interpreted as a net opportunity cost. Though
4Actually, if Φ denotes the probability function of a normalised Gaussian distribution, the money demand
is given by lθ,X = µ + σθ,X · Φ−1 (r + rθ,X) (Dhaene et al., 2002). Noting that Φ−1(0.5) = 0 the claim is
justified.
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Figure 1: Distorted Liquidity Demand
for Gaussian Risks (mean 15% and vol 20%)
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environmental facts, such as the perception of credit quality and gains in efficiency because
of improvements on analysis and administration, are expected to evolute on time, we can
regard them as softly modified — and not a matter of speculation. Also the risk attitude of
managers is supposed to remain more or less unchanged — as long as they are emotionally
stable. Therefore, the parameter θ is expected to remain stable and consequently, as long as
the probability distribution of the random variable X is also stable, the capital decisions of
investors should remain more or less the same and the economy as a whole should behave
accordingly.
However, if probability distributions evolve on time, so does the premium for solvency
rθ,X . Actually, this can be the case after a monetary expansion — which can be performed by
the central bank as well as by the entrance of new investors — since part of the extra money
is used to buy financial securities and if the increment in demand is high and persistent
enough to induce the price to rise more frequently, the probability of obtaining capital gains,
Pθ [X > 0] = Gθ,X(0) = rθ,X , is pushed to increase. In a similar way, a monetary contraction
can press the premium for solvency to decrease. This situation might in turn impel decision
makers to actualise expectations and so the informational parameter θ might be modified.
But this adjustment is supposed to be produced with a certain delay — for a time is required
for analysis — while the opportunity cost may be instantaneously altered. In other words,
prices are supposed to adjust more rapidly than quantities (as in Friedman, 1970). Therefore,
changes in the stock of money may induce instability from within in secondary markets.
Adjustments are performed along a stable money demand relationship, though the process
may be reinforced by structural modifications once expectations are actualised.
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Figure 2: Non-distorted Liquidity Demand
for Gaussian Risks and Different Volatilities
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4 Liquidity Shocks in Capital Markets
In the extended model presented in the previous section, the rational money demand has
been determined by the quantile (or inverse) function of the probability distribution rep-
resenting risks, modified according to knowledge and information. A particular feature of
the model is that a solvency premium, equal to the marginal reduction in capital gains re-
sulted from attracting the first unit of capital, affects the opportunity cost of money. This
means that interest rates are corrected into conformity with expectations and the prospects
of risks. However, as long as firms are allowed to attract funds at the same interest rate —
independently of the composition of their portfolio and their credit quality — the adjust-
ment is performed in accordance to a common set of information θ, representing the average
knowledge of the market:
r∗ = r + rθ,X (4)
Already Keynes (1935), on the grounds of the speculative motive, claimed the cash demand
depends on the return expected to prevail over a longer period, regarded as an anticipated
interest rate. This fact is stressed by monetarists (Friedman, 1970). Though r∗ cannot be
interpreted as an anticipated value in the same terms, it is also affected by expected capital
gains.
In Equation 3, both the probability distribution and the informational parameter alter
the money demand by affecting the decumulative probability function and the corrected
interest rate r∗. Such effects can be regarded as quantity and price adjustments respectively.
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Moreover, since the first adjustment involves a structural modification, it is supposed to be
performed after the second one, which corresponds to a movement along a stable relationship.
In this way, a fundamental assumption that is frequently implicit in macroeconomic analysis,
i.e. that prices adapt more rapidly than quantities, is incorporated in the model.
In order to obtain an expression for the cash balance demanded by the whole economy,
let us assume that economic agents hold aggregate exposures characterised by the random
variables X1, · · · , Xn. Capital is supplied by a central authority at a single interest rate r∗
(or, equivalently, secondary markets are regarded as competitive such that financial inter-
mediaries are price takers) relying on the informational parameter θ and the uncertainty
introduced by the market portfolio X∗. Then the aggregate money demand is given by:
lθ,−X∗ (r∗) =
n∑
i=1
G−1θ,−Xi (r
∗) = G−1θ,−X∗ (r
∗)
The second equality is a mathematical identity as long as the process of capital gains and
losses of the market portfolio is described by the comonotonic sum X∗ = Xc1+· · ·+Xcn, where
(Xc1, . . . , X
c
n) represents the comonotonic random vector with same marginal distributions
as (X1, . . . , Xn) and comonotonicity characterises an extreme case of dependence, when no
benefit can be obtained from diversification5. Thus precautionary investors rely on the most
pessimistic case, when the failure in any single firm spreads all over the market. When
differing expectations are allowed among decision makers, the aggregate money demand is
given by:
lθ1,...,θn,−X∗ (r
∗) =
n∑
i=1
G−1θi,−Xi (r
∗) = G−1θ1,...,θn,−X∗ (r
∗)
where Gθ1,..., θn,−X∗ =
(∑n
i=1G
−1
θi,−Xi
)−1
denotes the distribution function of the comonotonic
sum when marginal distributions are given by (Gθ1,−X1 , . . . , Gθn,−Xn).
LetM denote the total offer of money in the economy and let us analise how the monetary
equilibrium is established in the short-run:
M = Y · lθ1,...,θn,−X∗ (r∗)
As long as the expectations of decision makers and the stochastic nature of risks remain
unchanged, the adjusted rate of interest r∗ or the level of income Y are forced to vary for the
liquidity demand to fit a given stock of money. Hence, to avoid undesired fluctuations, the
central bank can modify the interest rate to adapt the liquidity preferences of investors to a
new equilibrium while keeping stable the level of income. However, as explained in Section
3, when the processes of assets returns are not stationary, part of the adjustment might be
prevented by the premium for solvency. This means that a stronger or a weaker movement
of the interest rate may be needed to reestablish the monetary equilibrium.
The mechanism can be regarded as an adjustment to inflationary and deflationary trends
in capital markets. Actually, if part of the cash available after a monetary expansion is
invested on assets, the total transactions spending, expressed in nominal units, will increase,
5The inverse probability distribution of the comonotonic sum is given by the sum of the inverse marginal
distributions (Dhaene et al., 2002).
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thus putting a pressure on prices to rise — though not necessarily affecting the real side of
the economy. As a consequence, the probability of capital gains will increase and so will
the premium for solvency, in this way stimulating decision makers to keep fewer provisions.
By contrast, after a monetary contraction, security prices might fall as a consequence of the
contraction of demand, independently of the real prospects of investments.
As times pass by, liquidity preference is affected by the new stochastic regime of the
market portfolio — characterised by the random variable X∗ — and so the interest-rate-
elasticity of the money demand may change. Moreover, individual exposures will be more
or less altered depending on the variations in the amounts of money spent on the respective
assets. In the medium-term investors actualise their expectations according to the new
market conditions. Since different combinations of the informational parameters θ1, . . . , θn
may lead to the same cash balance, the model allows multiple equilibria. Therefore, even if
the authority succeeded in stabilising the level of income, the new equilibrium may involve
a different distribution of resources in the economy.
The dependence of the liquidity demand on the variability of income becomes explicit in
a Gaussian setting. Let us assume in the following that individual exposures are distributed
as Gaussians with mean zero and volatilities σ1, . . . , σn, while the contributions of individual
exposures to the market portfolio are given by the coefficients λ1, . . . , λn, with 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 ∀i,
such that Y i = λi · Y and Y = Y 1 + · · · + Y n. Volatilities are expressed as proportions of
the levels of income and can be interpreted as the volatilities of different funds as well as
the distorted volatilities of a same Gaussian exposure — or some intermediate case. Since
the mean returns of funds are equal to zero — more generally, as long as the mean returns
of funds are the same — volatilities completely describe risks and efficiency is characterised
by low volatility. Under such conditions, the comonotonic sum is also a Gaussian random
variable with mean zero and volatility (Dhaene et al., 2002):
σ∗ =
n∑
i=1
λi · σi (5)
On these grounds, the weighted average volatility describes the uncertainty of the market
portfolio. Consequently, high volatility may be induced by a single group, as a negative
externality to more efficient companies and so the possibility of contagion naturally arises
in the model. In the same way, stability may be inherited by less efficient institutions when
low volatility predominates. In this context, aggregation is a determinant of the total cash
balance demanded by the economy.
Since the quantile function of a Gaussian random variable can be express in terms of the
standard normal distribution Φ (Dhaene et al., 2002), the short-run monetary equilibrium
is described by the following equation:
M = Y · lσ∗ (r∗) = Y · σ∗ Φ−1 (1− r∗) (6)
Therefore, the monetary equilibrium can be reestablished by modifying the level of nominal
income Y , the market volatility σ∗ or the interest rate r∗. As already stated, only r∗ is
expected to change in the short-run. Monitoring and analysis induce investors to eventually
incorporate the new regime of X∗ in decision making and possibly modify expectations,
both determinants of σ∗. During the process, the demand for goods and services may also
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be expanded or contracted depending on how spending is affected by the new stock of money.
Hence part of the adjustment may be performed on the level of nominal income Y .
The difference between the classic and the extended model presented in this paper, can
be appreciated by comparing Equations 1 and 6. Thus, while in Equation 1 the elasticity of
income with respect to the stock of money exclusively depends on the interest rate through
the liquidity preference function, in Equation 6 it is also affected by volatility. In addition,
if y represents the level of real income, the new short-run equilibrium can be written in real
terms as:
M = P σ∗ · Φ−1 (1− r∗) · y
Therefore, monetary policy cannot be only seen as the determination of the interest rate in
order to control the level of prices. To stabilise the product it is also required to control the
market volatility and the opportunity cost of money. A proper monetary policy should then
consider a combination of P , σ∗ and r∗ compatible with a given level of income.
Since Equation 6 is not likely to fit with exactitude to empirical observations, the level
of σ∗ can be found that preserves the monetary equilibrium for given values of M , Y and
r∗, which can be regarded as the induced volatility. A tentative criterion for monetary
policy may then be to determine the level of interest rates ensuring a given inflation and
induced market volatility. Additionally, the non-distorted volatility σ can be estimated by
the standard deviation of the random variable X∗ representing the capital losses of the
market portfolio. A measure of the degree of distortion performed by the market can thus
be obtained by comparing the induce with the non-distorted volatility6.
As stated in Section 1, the efficacy of monetary policy depends on the interest-rate-
elasticity, as well as on the stability, of the money demand. Instability is disregarded by
monetarists on the grounds of the rational expectations hypothesis, according to which, ra-
tional investors form their expectations by making the most efficient use of all information
provided by past history (Modigliani, 1977). Consequently, errors can only occur in short-
terms and so the economy is inherently stable. Keynes (1936) assumes, on the opposite, that
liquidity preference is affected by the speculative motive and that economic agents, when
forming their expectations, are controlled by animal spirits. Under such conditions, money
markets should be pretty unstable.
As can be seen from Equation 6, the point interest-rate-elasticity of the money demand
is affected by the level of interest rates in the extended model, but not by market volatility:
e =
r∗
lσ∗ (r∗)
· dlσ∗ (r
∗)
dr∗
=
r∗
Φ−1 (1− r∗) ·
dΦ−1
dr∗
(1− r∗) (7)
However, recall that the slope of the money demand depends on volatility (see Figures 1
and 2) in such a way that liquidity preference is more absolute for less stable economies.
Moreover, the opportunity cost of money, represented by the return offered by a given class
of money substitutes, is determined by open market operations performed by investors who
expend effort in analysis to appropriately estimate the prospects of business opportunities.
Thus movements along a stable long-run relationship may induce instability. The rational
6Specifically, the informational parameter θ∗ can be found for which the volatility σ∗ is related to the
transformed probability distribution of X∗.
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expectations hypothesis is maintained in this way, but with different consequences. Addition-
ally, the market volatility may remain unchanged at the time that individual exposures are
evolving, since multiple configurations of the parameters σ1, . . . , σn are compatible with the
same level σ∗. Consequently, stability is also related to the way the allocation of resources is
altered by monetary shocks. In the presence of frictions and limitations in the access to in-
formation, some companies or industries might be severely affected and in turn the economy
as a whole might be affected.
The function dΦ
−1
dr∗ attains a maximum when r
∗ = 0.5 and hence so does the magnitude
of the interest-rate-elasticity. Consequently, monetary policy is most efficient at this level.
As long as the opportunity cost approaches to any of the extreme cases r∗ = 1 or r∗ = 0
the liquidity demand becomes more elastic and it turns absolute for r∗ ≥ 1 and r∗ = 0.
Recall that capital decisions involve the exchange between a sure return and a confidence
probability level. Thus in the first case a capital gain is expected with probability equal
or greater than one, i.e. it is produced with certainty. Accordingly, investors not only do
not keep provisions for this asset, they actually agree to take new liabilities to provide the
guarantee and they are satisfied whatever the required volume of extra funds. By contrast,
when r∗ = 0 capital losses are expected with certainty and so investors agree on any level of
surplus in order to insure the exposure to risk.
5 Conclusions
Since no liquidity restrictions are expected in perfect markets, it is always possible to attract
or release funds under such conditions and accordingly, rational decision makers demand no
cash balances, as long as the value of the portfolio does not depend on the level of surplus
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In a Gaussian setting, risks are completely characterised by
the expected return and volatility, and a line of efficient portfolios exists, in the sense that, for
any combination of risk and equity outside the class, there is an alternative portfolio ensuring
the same return but less risk or the same level of exposure and a higher return. Moreover,
risk-aversion determines a set of preferred combinations of risk and equity. Therefore, a single
fund maximises the expected utility of investors showing a given degree of risk-aversion. On
these grounds, Tobin (1958) regards liquidity preference as behaviour towards risk.
A model is presented in this paper, referred to as the extended or the imperfect competition
model, to characterise the liquidity preference of investors facing liquidity constraints. Under
such circumstances, a level of surplus exists that maximises value and the rational money
demand is determined by the quantile function — a measure of the probability accumulated
in the tail of the distribution function — of the random variable representing the capital
losses of the residual exposure (see Equation 3). In this way, an equivalence is established
between a confidence level and the opportunity cost of capital and the optimal amount of cash
is determined by the exchange of a sure return and a flow of probability. An informational
parameter, affecting the opportunity cost of money, represents the expectations of decision
makers. Averse-to-risk and risk-lover investors respectively under and overestimate the cost
of capital and so they respectively demand more and less equity.
The quantile function, better known as Value-at-Risk or VaR in the Risk Management
literature, has become very popular among practitioners and researchers. This is in part a
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consequence of simplicity, since in a Gaussian setting the VaR is proportional to volatility
which in turn can be estimated by the standard deviation, a measure of the average variability
of a random variable. Alternatively, the VaR answers the question of how much can be lost
in the next trading period for a given level of probability — the confidence level — and so
it can be interpreted as a bound for expected losses. Given that the VaR then provides a
clear intuition, risk managers have naturally incorporated it into decision making.
The importance attached to liquidity preference in macroeconomic analysis is a conse-
quence of the fact that it determines the short-run monetary equilibrium of the economy. In
the classic approach, which is based on a partial equilibrium of the economy (Lucas, 2000;
Teles and Zhou, 2005), the amount of money which is compatible with given levels of nominal
income and interest rates can be obtained from Equation 1. According to the extended model
presented in this paper, the aggregate money demand of the economy is given by the sum of
the liquidity preferences of investors, mathematically characterised by the comonotonic sum
of individual exposures. The aggregate money demand is thus expressed as a Value-at-Risk
but referred to a market portfolio which relies on the most pessimistic case, when no gain
can be obtained from diversification. In a Gaussian setting, the comonotonic sum is also a
Gaussian variable, whose volatility is equal to the weighted average of individual volatilities
(see Equations 5 and 6). In this way, the classic model is extended allowing a correction for
risk.
Attempts have been made in recent literature to introduce uncertainty in the determi-
nation of the money demand, as part of an effort to explain the erratic path followed by
demanded cash balances since 1980. In Carpenter and Lange (2002), the money demand is
supposed to be affected by volatility in equity markets, a fact that is justified by the role
of money as a capital asset. As a matter of fact, growth and innovations in the financial
industry have reduced transaction costs and thus increased the substitutability between eq-
uities and money. Two indicators of market risk conditions, the volatility in equity prices
and the revisions to earning expectations, are then introduced into a linear regression and
both are statistically significant over the period starting in the early nineties. Greiber and
Lemke (2005) argue that liquidity preference has been stimulated by increased macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and low asset yields. Macroeconomic uncertainty is treated as an unob-
served process reflected in several economic indicators, such as financial market data, loss
and volatility measures, as well as on business and consumer sentiments. In this way, it is
proved that measures of uncertainty help to explain the increase in cash balances in the euro
area — specifically in the aggregate M3 — over the period 2001 to 2004.
Choi and Oh (2003) derive a money demand function from a general equilibrium frame-
work. In so doing, they suppose that monetary and output variables are determined by
log-normal processes, while investors preferences are given by a discounted expected-utility
operator. Liquidity preference is then determined by the maximisation of utility — subject
to constraints representing budget and market conditions — and in this way, given a level
of nominal interest rates, is negatively and positively affected by output and monetary un-
certainty respectively. The model allows to satisfactorily explain the cases of missing money
and velocity shifts already mentioned in Section 1. Other models that consider the role
of macroeconomic uncertainty in the determination of the money demand can be found in
Atta-Mensah (2004) and Baum et al. (2005).
Within the imperfect competition framework, the total stock of money M , the level of
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income Y , the interest rate r∗ and the market volatility σ∗ are all determinants of the short-
run monetary equilibrium (see Equation 6). Any of the last three variables may change
together with the monetary regime. Thus, as long as part of the funds available in the
economy are spent on capital assets, an adjustment in the opportunity cost r∗ is expected in
the short-run — stimulated by the modification of the stochastic nature of capital gains —
which is supposed to instantaneously affect liquidity preference (see Equations 4 and 2). In
the medium-term, investors correct their volatility estimations and so part of the adjustment
may be performed through volatility shocks. An important feature of the mechanism is that
volatility changes, motivated by flows of funds, determine expectations and not the opposite,
though liquidity preference might also be affected by a purely informational shock — not
supported by any change on the probability distributions characterising risks.
Recall that liquidity preference is not affected in the same way by capital gains and
losses. Thus, while positive returns affect the opportunity cost of money and so determine a
movement along a stable relationship, the precautionary attitude of decision makers depends
on negative returns and so does the shape of the money demand (see Equation 3). The first
adjustment is supposed to occur instantaneously, while the second one is performed gradually,
for it takes time to investors to internalise new market conditions. In practice, we are induce
to believe that both decisions should be related to different markets. Accordingly, the cost
of equity r∗ is represented by the average return over a class of securities, other than cash,
that can be regarded as substitutes to money. On the other hand, the liquidity preference
function depends on the series of returns over a set of instruments representative of assumed
exposures. Then the variability showed by a representative index of this class determines
the market volatility σ∗.
The stability of the money demand has been analysed by Teles and Zhou (2005), who
notice that though nominal interest rates have decreased considerably in the last quarter
century, the monetary aggregate M1 has increased very little in the same period (see also
Ball, 2001). A comparison between the evolution of the different monetary aggregates M1,
M2,M3 andMZM (see Figure 4 in Teles and Zhou, 2005) shows thatM1 has actually grown
at a lower rate than other monetary aggregates since 1980 and has remained roughly constant
after 1994 — M1 and MZM have respectively incremented in a five and nine percent since
1980. This fact represents a break in the money demand as estimated by classic methods.
Actually, different periods can be estimated using different elasticities (three periods are
proposed: 1900-1979, 1980-1994 and 1995-2003). A stochastic general equilibrium model
(based on the model of Lucas, 2000) allows Teles and Zhou (2005) establishing a relationship
for the money demand depending on the difference between the interest rates offered by a
class of nominal bonds and a class of money substitutes. They estimate the model for the
measures M1 and MZM and find that changing the monetary aggregate measure preserves
the long-run relationship of the money demand up to a constant factor.
Ball (2001 and 2002) claims that short-run fluctuations in money holdings are produced
by movements in near-money returns, such as saving accounts, money market deposits and
money market mutual funds. Such instruments are included in the class of MZM and a
cointegrating relation is proposed, with the real income and the opportunity cost as explana-
tory variables and a stochastic and stationary error-term accounting for deviations. Then
non-cointegration is rejected when sufficient lags of the variables are introduced. Moreover,
deviations from a long-run state are smaller when the return in near-money is considered
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instead of M1. A similar model is proposed by Dreger and Wolters (2006), but using M3 as
the measure of the opportunity cost and introducing inflation as an additional explanatory
variable.
As a general rule, it can be said that after the innovations and regulatory reforms that
has taken place since 1980, components of the transactions aggregateM1 bear interest, while
components of other savings aggregates are used for transactions. In this way, most velocity
shocks occurred after 1980 can be explained by increased volatility in near-money returns
and can thus be interpreted as movements along a money demand curve. However, as stated
by Teles and Zhou (2005), when changing the monetary aggregate the parameters of the
money demand relationship are also modified, in particular the interest-rate-elasticity (they
report an estimated elasticity 0.32 for the entire period 1900-2003 and elasticities 0.26, 0.12
and −0.07 for the subperiods 1900-1979, 1980-1994 and 1995-2003 respectively) suggesting
that an structural change takes place. Such a reasoning makes sense within the imperfect
competition framework, for risk explicitly affects liquidity preference.
Calza and Sousa (2003) have pointed out three main factors to explain why the money
demand has been more stable in the euro area than in other large economies: specific con-
ditions in the capital markets of different countries, the impact of financial innovation and
gains in stability obtained from aggregation. Idyosincratic behaviour — both at the investor
and sectorial levels — is accounted by the informational parameter in the imperfect com-
petition model. Regarding financial innovation, the degree of concentration and the role of
Germany are given by Calza and Sousa as possible explanations of why its influence has
been weaker in the euro area. Moreover, the lack of synchronisation of shocks to national
money demands guarantee a more stable environment. But most importantly, the fact that
Germany has a large weight in the M3 aggregate for the euro area and that the money
demand has been historically stable in that country contributes to the overall stability of the
euro area money demand. In other words, the stability of the German economy is shared by
the rest of the economies in the block, as a positive externality.
Such a conclusion is readily obtained from the extended model for, as stated in Equation
5, market variability is determined by the mean value of individual volatilities. Hence,
the market volatility will be mainly determined by a single institution or sector, in the
case it contributes more to the aggregate exposure. In particular, stability can be induced
in the whole market in this way. Moreover, the system accepts multiple equilibria, since
different combinations of individual volatilities may lead to the same market variability.
The terms under which market volatility shocks affect individual expectations about risks
will be determined by specific conditions, such as aggregation, restrictions in the access to
credit, the distribution of information within the market and the skills and knowledge of
investors. Thus, changes in the aggregate monetary stock may induce intermediaries to
favour bigger or more efficient companies, a situation that may become more difficult the
availability of funds and possibly increment more the riskiness of less productive sectors of
the economy. In this way, within the imperfect competition framework, a broader meaning
is given to instability.
Finally, a word can be said about the interest-rate-elasticity of the money demand. As
deduced from Equation 1, monetary policy is more efficient the more inelastic the liquidity
preference function, such that under perfect inelasticity investors are satisfied with the same
amount of cash for every level of the interest rate and so all adjustment is expected on the
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level of income. On the contrary, under absolute liquidity preference, i.e. when the money
demand is perfectly elastic, investors are satisfied at a single level of the interest rate and
so all the adjustment is expected from liquidity preference and none on the level of income.
In the later case, monetary policy is useless (Friedman, 1970; Modigliani, 1977; Howells and
Bain, 2005).
As established in Equation 7, in the extended model the point interest-rate-elasticity
depends on the level of the interest rate when risks are Gaussian. Looking at Figures
1 and 2, we notice the money demand follows a linear path across a wide range, but it
becomes parallel to the x-axis when approaching to it, meaning that it becomes more inelastic
when the opportunity cost approaches zero. In a similar way, the money demand becomes
parallel to the axis x = 1 when the opportunity cost approaches one. Therefore, since
the liquidity demand curve never touches the x-axis — as long as the random variable
representing the aggregate exposure is not bounded — there is no maximum level for cash
balances, which is in contradiction with common beliefs. This novel result is a consequence
of the equivalence established in the imperfect competition setting between the opportunity
cost and the confidence level (see Equation 3). Thus, when the return on money substitutes
approaches zero decision makers react as if the probability of obtaining capital gains was
close to zero and accordingly, they are forced to insure their residual exposures using only
cash balances. On the other hand, when the opportunity cost approaches one, the probability
of obtaining capital losses is close to zero and so fewer provisions are demanded.
Therefore, whatever the level of elasticity that predominates over the medium range of
the interest rate — i.e. no matter the level of stability of the economy in the medium range
— liquidity preference becomes absolute when the opportunity cost approaches zero. Since
the return in money substitutes is expected to be low in a depressed economy, lowering the
level of interest rates becomes investors more sensible to the cost of capital and eventually
stimulates them to demand all available cash balances for precautionary purposes. Under
such circumstances, the economy is found in a liquidity trap and any attempt of the monetary
authority to stimulate it by lowering the level of the interest rate will only do matters worse.
On the contrary, when the return on money substitutes is high — a situation that might
be stimulated by deregulation and financial innovation — less cash balances are demanded
than extrapolated by a linear relationship, a fact that could explain some missing money
events.
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